$\mu$VulDeePecker: A Deep Learning-Based System for Multiclass
  Vulnerability Detection by Zou, Deqing et al.
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON DEPENDABLE AND SECURE COMPUTING 1
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System for Multiclass Vulnerability Detection
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Abstract—Fine-grained software vulnerability detection is an important and challenging problem. Ideally, a detection system (or
detector) not only should be able to detect whether or not a program contains vulnerabilities, but also should be able to pinpoint the type
of a vulnerability in question. Existing vulnerability detection methods based on deep learning can detect the presence of vulnerabilities
(i.e., addressing the binary classification or detection problem), but cannot pinpoint types of vulnerabilities (i.e., incapable of addressing
multiclass classification). In this paper, we propose the first deep learning-based system for multiclass vulnerability detection, dubbed
µVulDeePecker. The key insight underlying µVulDeePecker is the concept of code attention, which can capture information that can
help pinpoint types of vulnerabilities, even when the samples are small. For this purpose, we create a dataset from scratch and use it to
evaluate the effectiveness of µVulDeePecker. Experimental results show that µVulDeePecker is effective for multiclass vulnerability
detection and that accommodating control-dependence (other than data-dependence) can lead to higher detection capabilities.
Index Terms—Vulnerability detection, multiclass classification, data-dependence, control-dependence, code gadget, code attention,
deep learning
F
1 INTRODUCTION
MOST cyber attacks are caused by the exploitation ofone or multiple vulnerabilities [1], [2]. It is unfor-
tunate that vulnerabilities are inevitable, for many rea-
sons (e.g., software complexity, steady growth in internet
complexity [3]). Given that vulnerabilities cannot be pre-
vented, an alternate defense approach is to detect and
patch vulnerabilities sooner rather than later, leading to the
field of vulnerability detection. This problem has received
a due amount of attention, leading to many approaches.
A popular approach is to use manually-defined patterns to
detect vulnerabilities [4], [5], [6], [7], [8], [9], [10], which
attained a limited success. Another promising approach is
to use machine learning for vulnerability detection (see, for
example, [11], [12]). These solutions reduce the workload on
human experts because they only need to roughly define
features for learning machine learning-based models that
can detect vulnerabilities, rather than defining vulnerabil-
ity patterns manually. Compared with traditional machine
learning techniques, researchers have started using deep
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learning for detecting vulnerabilities [13], [14] and software
defects [15], [16].
The state-of-the-art of deep learning-based vulnerability
detection is a system called VulDeePecker [13], which uses
Bidirectional Long-Short Time Memory (BLSTM) neural net-
work to detect software vulnerabilities. However, VulDeeP-
ecker is a binary classifier or detector, meaning that it can
tell whether a piece of code (i.e., multiple lines of code)
is vulnerable or not, but cannot pinpoint the type of the
vulnerability in question. The type of a vulnerability is
important because this information will tell the vulnerability
principles and help quickly pin down the precise location of
a vulnerability and reduce the workload of developers and
code auditors, which is especially important when the piece
of code has a substantial number of lines (e.g., tens number
of lines of code), which is also common to machine learning-
based vulnerability detection systems [17]. In this paper, we
move a step towards ultimately tackling this problem by
investigating multiclass vulnerability detection, which not
only can tell whether a piece of code is vulnerable or not,
but also can pinpoint the type of a vulnerability.
1.1 Our Contributions
We initiate the investigation on multiclass vulnerability de-
tection and present a system that uses deep learning for this
purpose. The system is called multiclass Vulnerability Deep
Pecker, or µVulDeePecker for short.
The innovations of the system are in three-fold. First,
a conceptual innovation underlying µVulDeePecker is the
introduction of the concept we call code attention, which can
accommodate information useful for learning local features
and helping pinpoint types of vulnerabilities. It refines the
concept of code gadget [13] which is a number of state-
ments that are semantically related to each other. Second,
another innovation underlying µVulDeePecker is redefining
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the concept and extraction method of code gadget by intro-
ducing control-dependence. The last innovation underlying
µVulDeePecker is a new neural network architecture. The
architecture is different from the models used in previous
vulnerability detection methods. It is mainly constructed
from building-block BLSTM networks and aims to fuse
different kinds of features from code gadget and code attention
to accommodate different kinds of information. This neural
network architecture may be of independent value because
it provides an effective fused idea for different code features
and can be referenced in other scenarios.
In order to evaluate the effectiveness of µVulDeePecker,
we create a dataset that contains 181,641 pieces of code
(called code gadgets, which are units for vulnerability de-
tection) from 33,409 programs. Among them, 138,522 are
non-vulnerable (i.e., not known to contain vulnerabilities)
and the other 43,119 are vulnerable and contain 40 types
of vulnerabilities in total. This dataset should be useful
to other researchers and is available at https://github.
com/muVulDeePecker/muVulDeePecker. Systematic ex-
periments using this dataset show the following: (i)
µVulDeePecker is effective for multiclass vulnerability de-
tection. In particular, the use of code attention can indeed
help recognize types of vulnerabilities, even if for small
samples. It is significant because deep learning often re-
quires large amounts of data in order to be effective. (ii) The
accommodation of control-dependence can indeed improve
the capability of µVulDeePecker in multiclass vulnerability
detection. (iii) It is possible to further improve the effec-
tiveness of µVulDeePecker by using it together with other
deep learning based detection systems, which may be able
to accommodate different kinds of information useful for
multiclass vulnerability detection.
1.2 µVulDeePecker vs. VulDeePecker
We name our multiclass vulnerability detection system,
namely µVulDeePecker, after the system known as VulDeeP-
ecker [13], which is the first deep learning-based binary
vulnerability detection system (i.e., only able to tell whether
a piece of code is vulnerable or not, but not the type of a
vulnerability in question). The reason we are so named is
that our system is inspired by VulDeePecker; indeed, we re-
fine the concept of code gadget introduced in [13], which only
captures data dependence, by additionally accommodating
control dependence, which leads to higher effectiveness
in multiclass vulnerability detection. However, we stress
that µVulDeePecker is not a simple incremental work over
VulDeePecker [13].
The reasons are as follows. First, our experiments show
that it is not effective to extend VulDeePecker for multi-
class vulnerability detection. For showing this, we consider
two variants of VulDeePecker. One variant, called VulDeeP-
ecker+, directly modifies the neural network architecture of
VulDeePecker. The other variant is to train a VulDeePecker-
based classifier for each type of vulnerabilities and each
trained model is applied every sample for vulnerability
detection. The latter variant has significant weaknesses (e.g.,
not scalable because there are many types of vulnerabilities;
not effective when the samples of one vulnerability type
are small), but is investigated for comparison purposes.
Second, we use new methods to prepare a dataset from
scratch to evaluate the effectiveness of µVulDeePecker since
the dataset published by the authors of VulDeePecker is
not sufficient for our purposes. This is because (i) their
dataset does not contain information on vulnerability types,
(ii) their dataset only accommodates data-dependence but
not control-dependence, and (iii) their dataset loses some
statements in the code gadgets, while these statements may
contribute to pinpoint vulnerability types (as elaborated
later). Third, a novel concept of code attention and its
extraction method are proposed in µVulDeePecker to help
pinpoint vulnerability types. Fourth, the neural network
architecture underlying µVulDeePecker is more involved
than the use of a standard BLSTM in VulDeePecker. The
innovation in µVulDeePecker architecture lies in the fusion
of different kinds of features; to the best of our knowledge,
we are the first to use the fusion idea in the context of
vulnerability detection.
1.3 Paper Organization
Section 2 discusses the basic ideas underlying µVulDee-
Pecker and the terminology used in the paper. Section 3
explains the detailed design of the system. Section 4 intro-
duces the implementation of the system. Section 5 is the
systematic experiment and analysis of the results. Section
6 is the related work. Section 7 discusses the limitation
and makes an explanation of the future work. Section 8
concludes the paper.
2 BASIC IDEAS AND TERMINOLOGY
In this section we describe the key idea underlying
µVulDeePecker and rigorously define the terminology used
in the present paper.
2.1 Basic Ideas
In order to detect the specific types of vulnerabilities, we
propose using the concept of code attention, which is inspired
by the notion of region attention in the image processing
[18]. The notion of region attention in image processing
was introduced to capture the insight that some regions
in an image provide more discriminative information for
accurate classification of the image. For example, when
human eyes observe an image containing a bird, the bird’s
eyes, mouth, and coat color provide more information than
other regions for identifying the type of the bird. Similarly,
code attention is composed of multiple program statements
in a piece of code and would provide more information for
classifying the type of a vulnerability. For example, when a
piece of code is detected as a vulnerability caused by illegal
library/API function calls, argument definition statements
in library/API function calls, control statements, and state-
ments containing library/API function calls may provide
more information for classifying the types of vulnerabilities.
The concept of code attention refines the concept of
code gadget, which is the key idea underlying the first
deep learning-based vulnerability detection system known
as VulDeePecker [13]. A code gadget, as defined in [13], is
a number of (not necessarily consecutive) statements that
accommodate the data-dependence relation. A code gadget
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captures some degree of syntax and semantic information
of vulnerabilities, explaining why it helps detect whether
a piece of code is vulnerable or not. As we will discuss
later, we further use a refined version of the notion of
code gadget, which captures not only the data-dependence
relation but also the control-dependence relation.
We propose using both the aforementioned refined no-
tion of code gadget and the aforementioned code attention
for training the multiclass vulnerability detection model.
Intuitively, the refined notion of code gadget captures more
“global” semantics information, which is conveyed by the
control-dependence and data-dependence relations between
the statements in a program, and thus would help achieve
a higher capability in detecting whether a piece of code is
vulnerable or not. The notion of code attention captures more
“localized” information within a statement (e.g., arguments
in a specific library/API function call) and would help rec-
ognize the specific type of a vulnerability. More specifically,
code attention enforces data source checking, critical path
checking (condition statements), and dangerous function
usage checking; these factors are closely related to the types
of vulnerabilities. In order to attain a full-fledged solution,
we propose fusing these two kinds of information into a
more comprehensive feature representation.
2.2 Definitions
In order to make our description precise, we use the follow-
ing definitions.
Definition 1 (program, statement and token). A program
P is an ordered set of statements, denoted by P =
{p1, p2, . . . , pε}, where pi (1 ≤ i ≤ ε) is a statement.
A statement pi is an ordered set of tokens, denoted by
pi = {ti,1, ti,2, . . . , ti,w}, where token ti,j (1 ≤ j ≤ w)
can be a variable identifier, function identifier, constant,
keyword or operator and so on.
Definition 2 (data-dependence [19]). Given a program P =
{p1, p2, . . . , pε}, a statement pi ∈ P , a variable identifier
token ti,j belonging to pi, statement pu (1 ≤ u ≤ ε) is
said to be data-dependent on token ti,j if ti,j is used in pu.
Definition 3 (control-dependence [19]). Consider two state-
ments pi, pj (i 6= j) in a program P = {p1, p2, . . . , pε}.
If the execution outcome of pi affects whether pj will be
executed or not, pj is said to be control-dependent on pi.
Definition 4 (code gadget [13]). Consider a program P =
{p1, p2, . . . , pε}, a library/API function call denoted by
fvi , and a statement pv (1 ≤ v ≤ ε) containing the func-
tion call fvi . Assume that pv contains a total of m func-
tion calls, then 1 ≤ vi ≤ m. Denote the arguments of the
function call fvi by a set Avi = {tvi,x1 , tvi,x2 , . . . , tvi,xη}.
A code gadget corresponding to function call fvi in state-
ment pv , denoted by svi , is an ordered set of statements
in P , each of which is either recursively data-dependent
on one or multiple arguments in Avi or control-dependent
on pv in a recursive manner.
Definition 5 (code attention). Consider a program P =
{p1, p2, . . . , pε}, a library/API function call fvi , a state-
ment pv (1 ≤ v ≤ ε) containing the function call fvi ,
and a code gadget svi corresponding to fvi in pv . Let
R = {rk}1≤k≤h be a set of rules describing vulnerability
syntax characteristics, which are vulnerability-specific
and thus elaborated later. A code attention with respect
to code gadget svi , denoted by cvi , is a subset of the
statements in code gadget svi that match the syntax
characteristics specified by some rk ∈ R.
3 DESIGN OF µVULDEEPECKER
Our objective is to design a multiclass vulnerability de-
tection system. Let {0, 1, 2, . . . ,m} denote a set of vulner-
ability types, where type-0 means “not vulnerable” and
type-i (1 ≤ i ≤ m) corresponds to a Common Weakness
Enumeration IDentifier or CWE-ID (which is the outcome
of a community effort at categorizing vulnerabilities [20]).
As the first study on multiclass vulnerability detection,
we focus on vulnerabilities related to library/API function
calls in C/C++ programs, while leaving the extension to
accommodating other vulnerabilities to future work.
We design µVulDeePecker in three modules: (i) parser,
which parses programs into code gadgets and code atten-
tions; (ii) vector representation extractor, which generates
vector representation of code gadgets and code attentions;
(iii) detector, which learns a vulnerability detection model
and uses this model for multiclass vulnerability detection.
As highlighted in Fig 1 and elaborated below, both the
training phase and the detection phase contain these three
modules, except that Step II (i.e., ground-truth labeling in
the training phase) is not relevant to the detection phase
because labels are pursued as the output of the detection
phase and that Step VI is about training a detector and Step
VI’ is about using the trained detector.
3.1 Training Phase
As highlighted in Fig 1(a), the parser is divided into Steps
I-IV, the vector representation extractor corresponds to Step
V, and the detector corresponds to Step VI. These steps are
elaborated below.
Step I: this step generates code gadgets from training
programs. Since this step is quite involved, we use the
example shown in Fig 2(a) to further illustrate ideas. It can
be divided into 3 sub-steps.
Step I.1: this step generates a System Dependency Graph
(SDGs) [21] for each training program. A SDG is derived
from a set of Program Dependence Graphs (PDGs) [22],
which represent data-dependence and control-dependence
relations. A PDG is a directed graph, wherein a node (or ver-
tex) represents a statement or control predicate and an arc
(or directed edge) represents a data- or control-dependence
relation between two nodes. There are standard algorithms
for generating PDGs for functions (see, for example, [22]). A
SDG can be derived from PDGs via the caller-callee relation.
Specific to the purpose of the present paper, we propose as-
sociate to each node with attributes, including the statement
text corresponding to the node and the type of the statement
(e.g. “expr”, “def”, “assign”). The second column in Fig
2(a) shows the SDG derived from the PDGs of functions
main and printMsg in the example program, where each
node is only highlighted with the corresponding statement
(represented by the Line number) for succinctness.
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Step II: labeling code gadgets
Step IV: generating code attentions 
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vector representations
Code gadgets:
wchat_t * data ; 
data = NULL ;
 ...
Vector representation:
[v0, v1, v2, v3, ...]
Training feature-fusion model
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Training global-feature 
learning model
(a) Training phase
Parser DetectorVector representation extractor
(b) Detection phase
Code 
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Input Output
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Step III: normalizing code gadgets
Token
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;
Vector
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Mapping table:
Step III: normalizing code gadgets Step VI': Classifying the 
vector representations using 
the trained vulnerability 
detection model
Step V: transforming 
normalized code gadgets and 
code attentions into vector 
representationsStep IV generating code attentions 
from normalized code gadgets
Fig. 1. Overview of µVulDeePecker’s three modules (i.e., parser, vector representation extractor, and detector) used in the training and detection
phases.
8:strncpy(dest, data, n);
Step I.2: identifying 
library/API function 
calls
7
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Step I.3: extracting code gadgets starting with 
library/API function calls
Step I.1: generating 
SDGs
main：
Program source code
Code gadget
1:  void main(){
2:      char data[5] = "AAAA";
3:      data[4] = '\0';
4:      char dest[5] = "";
5:       int n;
6:       scanf("%d", &n);
7:       if(n <= 4 && n > 0){
8:           strncpy(dest, data, n);
9:           dest[n] = '\0';
10:         printMsg(dest);
11:    }
12:    else
13:         printMsg(dest);
14: }
15: void printMsg(char* msg){
16:     if(msg != NULL)
17:          printf("%s\n", msg);
18: }
13
10
9
8
15
16 17
 printMsg：
1:   void main()
2:   char data[5] = "AAAA";
3:   data[4] = '\0';
4:   char dest[5] = "";
5:   int n;
6:   scanf("%d", &n);
7:   if(n <= 4 && n > 0)
8:   strncpy(dest, data, n);
9:   dest[n] = '\0';
10: printMsg(dest);
15: void printMsg(char* msg)
16: if(msg != NULL)
17: printf("%s\n", msg);
9: assign
3:assign
15: func
2:   char varb_0[5] = "AAAA";
4:   char varb_1[5] = "";
5:   int varb_2;
6:   scanf("%d", &varb_2); 
7:   if(varb_2 <= 4 && varb_2> 0)
8:   strncpy(varb_1, varb_0, varb_2);
16: if(varb_3!= NULL)
17: printf("%s\n", varb_3);
1: func
10: expr
Step IV: generating code attentions corresponding to code gadgets
(b) generating code attentions(a) generating code gadgets
Statement
Control dependence
Data dependence
Statement
7
6
4
5
2
3
1
10
9
8
data
n
dest
15
16 17 17: expr16: cond
7: cond
2:def
6: expr
5:def
4:def
8:exprdest
Fig. 2. (a) An example showing the generation of code gadget corresponding to function call strncpy in Line 8 of the program. (b) An example
showing the code attention derived from the code gadget, namely statements matching vulnerability syntax characteristics (highlighted in red-
colored boxes).
Step I.2: this step identifies library/API function calls
in programs of interest. It extracts library/API function
calls by matching statements associated to nodes to known
library/API function calls. For example, the third column in
Fig 2(a) contains the library/API function call strncpy in
Line 8 of the example program.
Step I.3: this step extracts code gadgets using a method
that is based on [19] but is different from the method used by
VulDeePecker [13]. We note that VulDeePecker (i) only con-
siders data-dependence, (ii) divides functions into forward
functions (which receive external inputs) and backward
functions (which do not receive external inputs), and (iii)
extracts forward (backward) slices from forward (backward)
function calls. The forward slice is obtained by slicing the
successors of the forward function call. Conversely, the
backward slice is obtained by slicing the precursors of the
backward function call. In contrast, we accommodate both
data-dependence and control-dependence when extracting
code gadgets in a bi-direction manner (i.e., considering both
forward and backward slices). Our approach to extracting
code gadgets is advantageous to the approach used by
VulDeePecker because (i) our approach accommodates both
data-dependence and control-dependence in code gadgets,
rather than data-dependence only, and (ii) our approach
considers all of the forward and backward slices rather
than extracting forward or backward slices by selecting
some forward or backward functions, which is the case in
VulDeePecker [13].
In order to see the preceding (ii), we consider the library
functions scanf and malloc as examples, which represent
the forward function of the input and the backward function
of the non-input. The function scanf would be defined
as a forward function and therefore lead to a forward
slice in VulDeePecker. However, the definition statements
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Algorithm 1 Extracting code gadgets (Step I.3)
Input: A SDG vertex n corresponding to statement pv
which contains library/API function call fvi ; the argu-
ments set Avi of function call fvi .
Output: A code gadget svi corresponding to fvi in pv .
1: function get for slice(tvi,xδ , n, sfvi )
2: Nsu ← the successor vertices set of n
3: for each nsu ∈ Nsu do
4: if nsu is data dependent on tvi,xδ or control
dependent on n then
5: sfvi ← sfvi ∪ {nsu}
6: n← nsu
7: get for slice(tvi,xδ , n, sfvi )
8: end if
9: end for
10: end function
11: function get back slice(tvi,xδ , n, sbvi )
12: Npre ← the predecessor vertices set of n
13: for each npre ∈ Npre do
14: if npre is data dependent on tvi,xδ or control
dependent on n then
15: sbvi ← sbvi ∪ {npre}
16: n← npre
17: get back slice(tvi,xδ , n, sbvi )
18: end if
19: end for
20: end function
21: function main(Avi , n)
22: svi ← ∅
23: sfvi ← ∅
24: sbvi ← ∅
25: for each tvi,xδ ∈ Avi do
26: get for slice(tvi,xδ , n, sfvi )
27: get back slice(tvi,xδ , n, sbvi )
28: end for
29: svi ← sfvi ∪ sbvi
30: return svi
31: end function
corresponding to the arguments of scanf can only be con-
tained in the backward slice of scanf , which leads to these
statements miss. These statements missed by VulDeePecker
would be important because they provide the information
about the types of these arguments and their memory sizes,
which can be leveraged as a reference when examining
whether these arguments have improper operations or not.
For another example of library function malloc, which is
defined as a backward function in [13], resulting in gen-
erating a backward slice. It also causes that the operation
statements of the memory allocated by malloc miss because
these statements only can be sliced in the forward slice of
malloc. But these operations are important as they are the
basis for judging whether memory leak or buffer overflow
has occurred. Therefore, we believe that only considering
forward slice or backward slice will cause information loss,
which may be useful in vulnerability detection. That is
why we consider both forward and backward slices in the
present paper.
Algorithm 1 elaborates Step I.3. Consider a library/API
function call fvi made in a statement pv , which is rep-
resented as a node n in the SDG in question. For each
argument tvi,xη of fvi , Algorithm 1 does the following: (i)
using function get for slice (Lines 1-10 in Algorithm 1) to
identify successors of node n in the SDG, namely the nodes
that are data-dependent upon tvi,xδ or control-dependent
upon n (either directly or indirectly), and then generates a
forward slice sfvi ; (ii) using function get back slice (Lines
11-20 in Algorithm 1) to identify predecessors of node n
recursively, upon which tvi,xδ is data-dependent or n is
control-dependent (either directly or indirectly), and then
generates a backward slice sbvi . Finally, Algorithm 1 merges
slices sfvi and sbvi (Line 29 in Algorithm 1) to obtain a
code gadget svi corresponding to function call fvi . The last
column in Fig 2(a) shows the example of extracting the code
gadget according to arguments data, dest and n of function
call strncpy.
Step II: this step labels each code gadget as “0” (not
vulnerable) or i (type-i vulnerability), where 1 ≤ i ≤ m.
These labels are the ground truth for training a multiclass
vulnerability detection model.
Step III: we observe that different programmers have
different coding habits (e.g., format, variables, and function
naming), which may affect the capability of multiclass vul-
nerability detection models. This motivates us to normalize
code gadgets by (i) mapping same variables and functions to
same values and (ii) renaming different variables and func-
tions according the order of their appearance (i.e., “varb 0”,
“varb 1”, . . .; “func 0”, “func 1”, . . .). However, reserved
words, library/API function names, and constant are not
mapped because they are standard. Fig 3 gives an example
of code gadget normalization.
char * data = new char[100];
memset (data ,  'A' , 100 - 1);
data[50 - 1] = '\0';
char dest[100];
memcpy (dest , data , 50);
printLine (dest);
void printLine (const char * line)
if ( line != NULL )
printf ("%s\n" , line );
char * varb_0 = new char[100];
memset (varb_0,  'A' , 100 - 1);
varb_0[50 - 1] = '\0';
char varb_1[100];
memcpy (varb_1, varb_0, 50);
func_0 (varb_1);
void func_0 (const char * varb_3)
if (varb != NULL )
printf ("%s\n" , varb_3);
Original code gadget Normalized code gadget
Fig. 3. Example of illustrating code gadget normalization.
Step IV: this step parses the normalized code gadgets to
generate code attentions according to vulnerability syntax
characteristics, which would contribute to the identification
of vulnerability types. For the vulnerabilities caused by
improper library/API function calls, we observe that the
arguments and usage of the library/API function calls affect
the occurrence of vulnerabilities. Taking into consideration
data source checking, data sanitized operation checking,
and library/API function calls usage plausibility checking,
we propose utilizing the following three syntax character-
istics: (i) definition statements of arguments in library/API
function calls, which would provide information useful to
identify improper use of library/API function calls (e.g.,
type and memory size of an argument) and distinguish
whether the vulnerability caused by data source; (ii) control
statements, which would help determine whether a pro-
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gram has conducted proper bounds-checking and security
screening before executing the target library/API function
calls; (iii) statements containing library/API function calls,
which would directly help recognize vulnerability types.
Corresponding to these vulnerability syntax characteristics,
we define rules as follows:
• Rule r1: if the attribute of a statement pi in code
gadget svi is a definition statement and the variables
defined in pi match the arguments in the library/API
function call, then pi is a statement in code attention
cvi . For example, statements 2, 4 and 5 in Fig 2(b) are
definition statements of arguments varb 0, varb 1
and varb 2, which are used in function call strncpy.
• Rule r2: if the attribute of statement pi in code gadget
svi is a control statement, then pi is a statement in
code attention cvi . For example, statements 7 and 16
in Fig 2(b) are such statements.
• Rule r3: if the attribute of statement pi in code gadget
svi contains library/API function calls, then pi is a
statement in code attention cvi . For example, state-
ments 6, 8, and 17 in Fig 2(b) are such statements.
Algorithm 2 Extracting code attention (Step IV)
Input: Normalized code gadget svi ; a set R = {rk}1≤k≤h of
rules to match syntax characteristics of vulnerabilities.
Output: Code attention cvi in code gadget svi .
1: cvi ← ∅
2: for each statement pi ∈ svi do
3: Parse pi into an ordered set of tokens
{ti,1, ti,2, . . . , ti,w} via a lexical analysis, obtaining
attribute attr for statement pi
4: for each rk ∈ R do
5: for each token ti,j ∈ {ti,1, ti,2, . . . , ti,w} do
6: if attr and ti,j match rk then
7: cvi ← cvi ∪ {pi}
8: end if
9: end for
10: end for
11: end for
12: return cvi
Using the aforementioned vulnerability syntax charac-
teristics, Algorithm 2 extracts a code attention from a nor-
malized code gadget. The algorithm can be understood as
follows. For each statement pi in svi , Algorithm 2 parses
statement pi into an ordered set of tokens by a lexical
analysis, infers attribute attr of statement pi (e.g., “def”,
“cond”) by analyzing the context structure of these tokens,
and uses each token and attr to match the rules in a
given rule set R = {rk}1≤k≤h to generate code attentions.
Currently, we only use a rule setR = {r1, r2, r3} of the three
rules mentioned above.
Step V: this step converts normalized code gadgets and
code attentions respectively to fixed-length code gadget vec-
tors and code attention vectors. The conversion is attained
by a simple word embedding [23]. These vectors are the input
for training neural networks.
Step VI: inspired by the multi-feature fusion method in
image and video recognition [24], we propose a new neural
network architecture that uses the BLSTM as a building-
block because BLSTM is shown to be capable of detecting
vulnerabilities [13]. The network, as highlighted in Fig 4,
deals with two kinds of features: global features, which are
denoted byHi’s in Fig 4, are learned from code gadgets, and
accommodate some broader semantics about the relations
between statements in a program; local features, which are
denoted by hi’s in Fig 4, are learned from code attentions,
and are specific to individual statements in a program (e.g.,
arguments in a specific library/API function call). Since
these two kinds of features accommodate different kinds of
information, we use a feature fusion to learn comprehensive
features. As a result, the network consists of the follow-
ing three BLSTM networks: global-feature learning model,
local-feature learning model, and feature-fusion model. For
learning global features from code gadgets, the model uses
a pre-processing layer and deep BLSTM layers, where the
preprocessing layer mainly filters the 0 vectors and the deep
BLSTM layers actually learn global features. Each neuron is
equivalent to a time step and receives a word in a code
gadget. For learning local features from code attentions, the
model uses the same network (for learning global features)
but at a smaller scale (because vectors representing code at-
tentions are shorter than vectors representing code gadgets).
For fusing global and local features, the model uses a merge
layer, a BLSTM layer and a softmax classifier, where the
merge layer connects the learned global and local features
and the BLSTM layer adjusts the spliced features. Finally,
the fused features are loaded into the classifier.
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Fig. 4. The µVulDeePecker neural network architecture.
Summarizing the preceding discussion, we first train
a global-feature learning model as well as a local-feature
learning model and then train the feature-fusion model.
The resulting system is used for multiclass vulnerability
detection. Details of the training strategy are elaborated in
Section 4.2 with respect to a specific training phase.
3.2 Detection Phase
As highlighted in Fig 1(b), this phase contains the following
steps.
Step I: this step generates code gadgets from target
programs for vulnerability detection (and is similar to Step
I in the training phase).
Step III: this step normalizes code gadgets (and is simi-
lar to Step III in the training phase).
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Step IV: this step extracts code attentions from code
gadgets (similar to Step IV in the training phase).
Step V: this step transforms the normalized code gadgets
and code attentions to vector representations (and is similar
to step V in the training phase).
Step V’: this step classifies vector representations using
the learned µVulDeePecker model, outputting the vulnera-
bility types of code gadgets (recalling that type-0 means the
code gadgets is not vulnerable).
3.3 Generalization Analysis
µVulDeePecker can only detect vulnerabilities caused by
C/C++ library/API function calls currently, but the tech-
niques used are extensible (e.g., extracting code gadgets and
code attentions). µVulDeePecker can be adopted/adapted
to accommodate other programming languages and other
types of vulnerabilities, but the generalization should ad-
here to the following premise:
• The software source code to be generalized must be
able to be parsed into SDG structures.
• The type of vulnerability to be generalized must
have an interesting entity. For example, the entity of
interest in this paper is C/C++ library/API function
calls.
• The type of vulnerability to be generalized must
exhibit the following 3 perspectives: data source
checking, data sanitized operation checking, and in-
terested entity usage plausibility checking.
If the target language and target vulnerability type to be
generalized satisfy the above premises, µVulDeePecker can
be extended, which is also the future work of us.
4 IMPLEMENTATION AND EVALUATION METRICS
In this section, we describe the preparation of the
dataset for training and testing and the implementation of
µVulDeePecker.
4.1 Dataset Preparation
Our sources of vulnerabilities are Software Assurance Ref-
erence Dataset (SARD) [25] and National Vulnerability
Database (NVD) [26].
SARD provides a large set of production, synthetic, and
academic programs (a.k.a. test cases) with known vulnera-
bilities. A program is labeled as “good” (i.e., not vulnerable),
“bad”(i.e., vulnerable), or “mixed” (i.e., both vulnerable and
patched versions are available). For a vulnerable program,
SARD provides the statements containing the vulnerability
and the vulnerability type in CWE-ID (Common Weakness
Enumeration IDentifier) [20]. NVD contains a large number
of vulnerabilities in production software and provides the
software products affected, the vulnerable versions, the
CWE-IDs, and the patch files. In total, we collect 33,409
programs written in C/C++ corresponding to 116 CWE-IDs,
including (i) 57 “good” programs, 925 “bad” programs, and
3,2104 “mixed” programs collected from SARD and (ii) 323
vulnerable programs collected from NVD. Since CWE-IDs
are hierarchic (e.g., CWE-121 contains CWE-787 and CWE-
788 as sub-types), we aggregate CWE-IDs to the third level
of the CWE-ID tree [27] (i.e., the research concept view) and
use these third-level CWE-IDs as vulnerability types. For
example, CWE-121 is a sub-type of CWE-119, which is at the
third level of the CWE-ID tree, and as such we use CWE-
119 as the vulnerability type for a CWE-121 vulnerability
as well. This leads to 40 different vulnerability types (i.e.,
m = 40 plus the non-vulnerability type), which are listed in
Table 1. We observe that most vulnerabilities do not contain
vulnerability sub-types, but some of them do (e.g., Type-7
or CWE-415 is a sub-type contained in three types CWE-
119, CWE-666, and CWE-573); this is caused by the CWE-ID
tree structure mentioned above. We randomly respectively
select 80% SARD programs and 80% NVD programs as the
training set and the rest as the testing set for experiments.
TABLE 1
The specific vulnerability types and their corresponding labels of the 40
types of vulnerabilities in this paper.
Labels Vulnerability Types Labels Vulnerability Types
1 CWE-404 21 CWE-170
2 CWE-476 22 CWE-676
3 CWE-119 23 CWE-187
4 CWE-706 24 CWE-138
5 CWE-670 25 CWE-369
6 CWE-673 26 CWE-662, CWE-573
7 CWE-119, CWE-666, CWE-573 27 CWE-834
8 CWE-573 28 CWE-400, CWE-665
9 CWE-668 29 CWE-400, CWE-404
10 CWE-400, CWE-665, CWE-020 30 CWE-221
11 CWE-662 31 CWE-754
12 CWE-400 32 CWE-311
13 CWE-665 33 CWE-404, CWE-668
14 CWE-020 34 CWE-506
15 CWE-074 35 CWE-758
16 CWE-362 36 CWE-666
17 CWE-191 37 CWE-467
18 CWE-190 38 CWE-327
19 CWE-610 39 CWE-666, CWE-573
20 CWE-704 40 CWE-469
4.2 Training Phase
This phase is divided into the following six Steps.
Step I: for generating code gadgets from training pro-
grams, we use the open source C/C++ code analysis tool
Joern [28] to construct PDGs for functions in each training
program. Then, we generate an SDG according to the caller-
callee relation between these functions, and traverse each
node in the SDG to identify the nodes that contain any of
the 811 C/C++ library/API function calls related to security
which are publicly available in the rules of Checkmarx [4].
Finally, we extract the arguments of each function call and
use Algorithm 1 to generate code gadgets.
Step II: the vulnerable statements in a vulnerable pro-
gram collected from SARD are readily available from the
dataset. The vulnerable statements in a vulnerable program
collected from NVD are the statements that are deleted in
the patch files. If a code gadget contains one or more vulner-
able statements, it is labeled as vulnerable with vulnerability
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type-i where 1 ≤ i ≤ 40; otherwise, it is labeled as type-0
(i.e., non-vulnerable).
Step III and Step IV: for each code gadget, we write
an automate lexical-analysis-based program to analyze each
token (e.g., variables, operators, keywords) in statements.
We mainly analyze the types and the context structures of
them for identifying the variable and function names and
rename them. Finally, we use Algorithm 2 on the normalized
code gadgets to extract code attentions.
Step V: for normalized code gadgets, we use a lexical
analysis to generate a corpus of program tokens. Then, we
use the word-to-vector tool [29] to generate the vectors
for representing those tokens. The word-to-vector model
we use is skip-gram [30], with window size 10 and vector
dimension 50. Since the vector input to the neural network
is fixed-length, we use τ1 and τ2 respectively for the length
of code gadgets and the length of code attentions, while
noting that these hyperparameters are tuned in the training
phase. For code gadgets (code attentions) containing fewer
words or shorter vectors than τ1 (τ2), we pad 0 vectors at
their tail to make their vectors of length τ1 (τ2); for code
gadgets (code attentions) containing more words or longer
vectors than τ1 (τ2), we cut their vectors at the tail of code
gadgets (code attentions) to match length τ1 (τ2).
Step VI: recall that we use the BLSTM as a building-
block for constructing µVulDeePecker neural network ar-
chitecture. Our implementation of the model uses Keras
[31]. We first train global-feature and local-feature learning
models by tuning parameters — “optimizer”, “learning
rate”, “batch size”, “dropout”, “layers”, “the number of
nodes in a hidden layer”, and “epochs” — to achieve the
optimal results via the method called grid search, which
searches the optimal values of these hyperparameters by
performing an exhaustive search. Next, we search for the
best fusion method via the permutation and combination
of global-feature and local-feature models, while fixing the
hyperparameters. Finally, we tune the hyperparameters of
the feature-fusion model and obtain the µVulDeePecker
neural network. We train the three networks separately so as
to prevent the features learned from one network from being
destroyed by the others. The specific hyperparameter values
of each model obtained in training phase are summarized in
Table 2.
4.3 Detection Phase
In the detection phase, we perform 5 steps for target pro-
grams, of which the first 4 steps are the same as Step I, III, IV,
V in the training phase. In Step VI’, we input the code gadget
vectors and their corresponding code attention vectors to be
tested into the trained µVulDeePecker model. The model
outputs whether the code gadgets contain vulnerabilities
and if so, outputs their classes.
Totally, we extract 181,641 code gadgets (145,353 in
the training set and 36,288 in the testing set) whose av-
erage/median number of lines-of-code is 140/120, among
which 175,415 are from SARD (including 42795 vulnerable
and 132620 non-vulnerable) and 6,226 from NVD (includ-
ing 324 vulnerable and 5902 non-vulnerable). To sum up,
there are 138,522 non-vulnerable code gadgets and 43,119
vulnerable code gadgets covering 40 vulnerability types
which are listed in Table 1. This labeled dataset, called
Multiclass Vulnerability Dataset (MVD), is available at https:
//github.com/muVulDeePecker/muVulDeePecker.
4.4 Evaluation Metrics
For evaluating multiclass vulnerability detectors, we use the
following metrics (see, for example, [32]). Let L be a set of
vulnerability types (in this paper, |L| = m = 40), Let TPl,
FPl, FNl, TNl and Xl respectively be the number of true
positive samples, false positive samples, false negative sam-
ples, true negative samples, and the total number of samples
with respect to vulnerability type l, where 1 ≤ l ≤ m = 40.
The metrics for evaluating multiclass vulnerability de-
tectors are M FPR (the multiclass counterpart of the false
positive rate based on the total number of vulnerability
classes), M FNR (the multiclass counterpart of the false
negative rate based on the total number of vulnerability
classes), M F1 (the multiclass counterpart of the F1 mea-
sure based on the total number of vulnerability classes),
W FPR (the multiclass counterpart of the false posi-
tive rate based on the weight of each vulnerability class),
W FNR (the multiclass counterpart of the false negative
rate based on the weight of each vulnerability class), W F1
(the multiclass counterpart of F1 measure based on the
weight of each vulnerability class). The M ∗ metrics are
arithmetic average of the metrics of the overall vulnerability
classes. TheW ∗metrics are the average in which metrics of
each vulnerability class are multiplied by the weight before
summing. The weight here refers to the proportion of the
number of each vulnerability class in the total number of
vulnerabilities. Specifically, we have:
M FPR =
1
|L|
∑
l∈L
FPl
FPl+TNl
,
M FNR =
1
|L|
∑
l∈L
FNl
TPl+FNl
,
M F1 =
1
|L|
∑
l∈L
2·Pl·Rl
Pl+Rl
,
W FPR = 1∑
l∈L|Xl|
∑
l∈L |Xl| · FPlFPl+TNl ,
W FNR = 1∑
l∈L|Xl|
∑
l∈L |Xl| · FNlTPl+FNl ,
W F1 = 1∑
l∈L|Xl|
∑
l∈L |Xl| · 2·Pl·RlPl+Rl .
Note that when |L| = 1, M FPR naturally degenerates
to the false positive rate (FPR) of binary vulnerability de-
tector, M FNR naturally degenerates to the false negative
rate (FNR) of binary vulnerability detector, and M F1 nat-
urally degenerates to the F1 measure of binary vulnerability
detector. However, W FPR, W FNR, and W F1 do not
have their counterparts when |L| = 1.
5 EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS
Our experiments are centered at answering the following
Research Questions (RQs):
• RQ1: how effective is µVulDeePecker for multiclass
vulnerability detection?
• RQ2: does accommodating control-dependence in-
deed improve the effectiveness of µVulDeePecker in
multiclass vulnerability detection?
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON DEPENDABLE AND SECURE COMPUTING 9
TABLE 2
The hyperparameter values of the global-feature learning model, local-feature learning model, and feature-fusion model.
Hyper-parameters Global-feature learning model Local-feature learning model Feature-fusion model
Optimizer RMSprop RMSprop RMSprop
Loss function categorical crossentropy categorical crossentropy categorical crossentropy
Activation function tanh tanh tanh
Learning rate 0.001 0.001 0.001
Batch size 64 64 64
Dropout 0.5 0.5 0.5
Layers 2 2 1
Nodes in a hidden layer 300 200 500
Epochs 60 60 10
• RQ3: can µVulDeePecker be used with other deep-
learning-based systems (e.g., VulDeePecker) to ob-
tain higher effectiveness?
Whenever appropriate, we will consider the following
extension of VulDeePecker (which was designed for de-
tecting whether a program is vulnerable or not), dubbed
VulDeePecker+, for multiclass vulnerability detection: Un-
like VulDeePecker, which uses the sigmoid activation func-
tion and the binary crossentropy loss function, we propose
using the softmax activation function and the categorical
crossentropy loss function, leading to a variant which we
call VulDeePecker+. We should compare µVulDeePecker
against with other multiclass detectors. Since open-source
tools (e.g., Flawfinder) have poor detection capabilities [13]
and we have no access to commercial tools (e.g., For-
tify and Coverity, no budget to buy), we only compare
µVulDeePecker against VulDeePecker+. Our experiments
are performed on a computer with an Intel Xeon E5-
1620 CPU operating at 3.50GHz and an NVIDIA GeForce
GTX 1080 GPU. The operating system is Linux 3.10.0-
514.6.2.el7.x86 64.
5.1 Experiments for Answering RQ1
In order to evaluate the effectiveness of µVulDeePecker, we
apply it to (i) the testing set mentioned above and (ii) real-
world product software.
5.1.1 Experiments on Testing Set
Table 3 summarizes the experimental results. We observe
that M FPR, M FNR, and M F1 of µVulDeePecker are
0.02%, 5.73%, and 94.22%, respectively. When compared
with VulDeePecker+, µVulDeePecker is 0.01% lower in
terms of M FPR, 10.75% lower in terms of M FNR, and
8.72% higher in terms of M F1. This might be explained
by the fact that the local features learned from code atten-
tions accommodate much information about vulnerability
types, leading to much smaller multiclass false negative
rate. Moreover, measurements of W FPR, W FNR, and
W F1 also indicate that µVulDeePecker is more effective
than VulDeePecker+. As to the test time, although the time
of µVulDeePecker is slightly higher than VulDeePecker+,
considering the detection effectiveness of µVulDeePecker,
the time consumption is tolerable.
Fig 5 plots the detection result of µVulDeePecker and
VulDeePecker+, in terms of the F1, with respect to each of
TABLE 3
Experimental results on the testing set with respect to µVulDeePecker
and VulDeePecker+ (for answering RQ1).
Models M FPR(%)
M FN
R(%)
M F1
(%)
W FP
R(%)
W FN
R(%)
W F1
(%)
Time
(s)
µVulDe-
ePecker 0.02 5.73 94.22 0.13 7.49 94.69 1413.12
VulDee-
Pecker+ 0.03 16.48 85.5 0.3 7.37 93.61 1063.14
the 40 vulnerability types. We observe that µVulDeePecker
is overall more effective than VulDeePecker+, especially
for vulnerability types CWE-673, CWE-362, CWE-170, sub-
type of CWE-662 and CWE-573, and CWE-467. In order to
explain this discrepancy, we observe that these five types
have small numbers of vulnerabilities: 16 vulnerabilities for
CWE-673, 211 for CWE-362, 45 for CWE-170, 33 for the
sub-type of CWE-662 and CWE-573, and 55 for CWE-467;
these vulnerabilities might have been ignored by VulDeeP-
ecker+ as noise. For example, CWE-467 is a type of vul-
nerabilities related to function call sizeof(), which cannot
be recognized by VulDeePecker+ because it often occurs
in conjunction with buffer overflows (i.e., another type of
vulnerabilities). In contrast, µVulDeePecker can cope with
sizeof() by leveraging its arguments, which are captured
by code attentions.
5.1.2 Experiments on Real-World Software
We apply µVulDeePecker to 10 versions of 3 real-world soft-
ware products, namely Libav, Seamonkey, and Xen. Since
we do not know whether these products contain vulnera-
bilities or not (i.e., the ground truth is not available), we
manually examine and confirm the detected vulnerabilities.
Experimental results show that µVulDeePecker detects 16
vulnerabilities, among which 14 vulnerabilities correspond
to patterns of known vulnerabilities. Among these 14 vul-
nerabilities, 6 vulnerabilities (respectively corresponding to
the patterns of CVE-2013-0866, CVE-2013-4264, CVE-2013-
7012, CVE-2013-7022, CVE-2013-7023, and CVE-2014-9319)
are detected in Libav, 3 vulnerabilities (respectively cor-
responding to the patterns of CVE-2015-4511, CVE-2015-
4513, and CVE-2015-4517) are detected in Seamonkey, and 5
vulnerabilities (respectively corresponding to the patterns
of CVE-2013-4149, CVE-2013-4150, CVE-2014-5263, CVE-
2016-4952, and CVE-2016-9923) are detected in Xen. These
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Fig. 5. Experimental comparison between the effectiveness of µVulDeePecker and VulDeePecker+ with respect to each of the 40 vulnerability types.
vulnerabilities include out-of-bounds read, use-after-free,
and improper restriction of operations within the bounds
of a memory buffer. The other 2 vulnerabilities are new
because they are not known to exist in Xen 4.4.0 to the public
until now (despite that they respectively correspond to the
patterns of CVE-2015-7512 and CVE-2016-5126), but have
been silently fixed by the software vendor when releasing
newer versions. These 2 vulnerabilities are caused by buffer
overflow and are highlighted in Table 4 (for ethical reasons,
we anonymized the file name of the vulnerable program).
We map CVE# to them in Table 4 because they were detected
via the patterns corresponding to those CVE#’s. Summariz-
ing preceding discussions, we draw:
Insight 1. µVulDeePecker is effective for multiclass vul-
nerability detection, especially its use of local features
learned from code attentions makes it effective even
when samples are small.
5.2 Experiments for Answering RQ2
In order to quantify the value of control-dependence in
multiclass vulnerability detection, we prepare a dataset that
only contains data-dependence, which is indeed obtained
by considering data-dependence relation only in Step I.1 of
µVulDeePecker. The same 80% of the dataset (i.e., the code
gadgets corresponding to the same programs in the training
set for learning µVulDeePecker) is used for training, and the
rest 20% is used for testing.
Table 5 summarizes the experimental results. We ob-
serve that when additionally accommodating control-
dependence, µVulDeePecker can improve M F1 by 12.63%,
W F1 by 11.13% and decrease M FNR by 12.27%, W FNR
by 6.9%. This justifies the value of accommodating control-
dependence relation in multiclass vulnerability detection,
which is intuitive. In summary, we draw:
Insight 2. Accommodating control-dependence enhances
the capability of µVulDeePecker in multiclass vulnera-
bility detection.
5.3 Experiments for Answering RQ3
In order to answer RQ3, we use µVulDeePecker and
VulDeePecker+ together with respect to the dataset accom-
modating both data-dependence and control-dependence,
as follows: For a code gadget sample (including its code
attention), suppose µVulDeePecker detects it as type-i with
probability pi and VulDeePecker+ detects it as type-j with
probability qj , where 0 ≤ i, j ≤ m (with m = 40 corre-
sponding to our dataset). Then, the vulnerability type of the
sample is set to be i or j corresponding to the maximum
probability, namely
max(pi, qj) = max(p0, . . . , pm, q0, . . . , qm).
Table 6 summarizes the results, which show that using
µVulDeePecker and VulDeePecker+ together indeed leads
to better detection accuracy (2.65% and 1.59% higher in
M F1 and W F1). This suggests that µVulDeePecker and
VulDeePecker+ accommodate different kinds of information
useful for multiclass vulnerability detection. In summary,
we draw:
Insight 3. µVulDeePecker can be used together with other
deep-learning-based systems such as VulDeePecker+ to
accommodate more, useful information for multiclass
vulnerability detection.
6 RELATED WORK
Vulnerability detection in the source code is a fundamental
problem of software security. Many scientists have con-
ducted research on this issue and many good methods
have been proposed. We divide prior studies on source-code
vulnerability detection into three approaches: rule-based vs.
similarity-based vs. pattern-based.
6.1 Rule-Based Vulnerability Detection
In this approach, vulnerability detection is based on some
rules that are often defined by human experts. Open-
source systems under this approach include Flawfinder [33],
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TABLE 4
The 2 vulnerabilities, whose existence is not known until now, found by µVulDeePecker in real-word software products.
Real-world software CVE-ID CWE-ID The path of vulnerable files Library/APIfunction call
The first patched
version
Xen 4.4.0 CVE-2015-7512 CWE-119 .../hw/net/anonymized.c memcpy Xen 4.6.3
Xen 4.4.0 CVE-2016-5126 CWE-119 .../block/anonymized.c memcpy Xen 4.8.0
TABLE 5
Experimental results of µVulDeePecker with respect to different
datasets (for answering RQ2).
Models M FPR(%)
M FNR
(%)
M F1
(%)
W FPR
(%)
W FNR
(%)
W F1
(%)
Dataset accommodating data and control dependences
µVulDe-
ePecker 0.02 5.73 94.22 0.13 7.49 94.69
Dataset accommodating data dependence only
µVulDe-
ePecker 0.1 18 81.59 0.94 14.39 83.56
TABLE 6
Experimental results with respect to use one detector or multiple
detectors (for answering RQ3).
Models M FPR(%)
M FNR
(%)
M F1
(%)
W FPR
(%)
W FNR
(%)
W F1
(%)
µVulDe-
ePecker 0.02 5.73 94.22 0.13 7.49 94.69
using
both 0.01 4.46 96.87 0.08 5.53 96.28
Cvechecker [6], Cppcheck [5], FindBugs [34], and Splint [35].
These tools use simple rules to characterize vulnerabilities
and have limited successes. Commercial systems under
this approach include Checkmarx [4], Coverity [36], IBM
Security AppScan Source [37], and CodeSonar [38]. These
commercial tools are more capable than the open-source
tools mentioned above. The third category is the academic
research methods. These academic research results are gen-
erally targeted at certain aspects of vulnerability detection
and propose better vulnerability rules [39], [40], [41]. This
approach largely relies on human experts to define rules. In
contrast, µVulDeePecker aims to automate the vulnerability
detection process as much as possible, especially without
relying on human experts to define rules with respect to
every vulnerability.
6.2 Similarity-Based Vulnerability Detection
Since code-cloning is widely observed in practice, this ap-
proach aims to detect vulnerabilities that are often caused
by code-cloning. The basic idea is that when a piece of code
is cloned, the vulnerability in it is automatically replicated;
this explains why detecting a piece of code that similar to a
piece of vulnerable code could detect vulnerabilities. In this
approach, similarity can be measured using tokens [10], [42],
strings [7], [43], trees [44], [45], graphs [8], or their hybrids
[46]. This approach cannot detect vulnerabilities that are not
caused by code-cloning [13]. µVulDeePecker does not follow
this approach.
6.3 Pattern-Based Vulnerability Detection
Rather than relying on human experts for defining vulner-
ability rules, this approach is intended to define features
and use machine learning techniques to automatically learn
vulnerability patterns [9], [11], [12], [47], [48], [49], [50].
These studies still rely on human experts to define fea-
tures to characterize vulnerabilities. A recent development
is to exploit deep learning, which has a great potential
in reducing the burden on human experts for defining
features. VulDeePecker [13] is the first system using deep
learning to detect vulnerabilities at slice-level, while noting
that there are also related studies on using deep learning
for vulnerability discovery at the function level [14], [51],
defect prediction [15] and related tasks [16]. Above systems
are binary classifiers by telling whether a piece of code is
vulnerable or not.
The present study follows this approach and more
specifically extends VulDeePecker to detect multiclass vul-
nerabilities. As discussed above, the extension is based on
enhanced concept of code gadget, novel concept of code
attention and a novel neural network architecture because
a straightforward extension does not lead to good accuracy.
7 LIMITATIONS
The present study has limitations. First, µVulDeePecker
can detect vulnerability types, but cannot pin down the
precise location of a vulnerability at a granularity finer
than code gadget. Although the granularity of code gadget,
which consists of a number of statements, is substantially
finer than the widely used granularity of programs, files or
functions, it is an interesting future work to precisely pin
down the location (e.g., exactly the vulnerable statements
but nothing more) of a vulnerability. This is important
because it will alleviate human analysts in pinning down
locations of vulnerabilities. Second, the current design and
implementation of µVulDeePecker are geared towards pro-
grams written in C/C++. future research needs to consider
programs written in other programming languages. Third,
the current design and implementation of µVulDeePecker
focus on vulnerabilities that are related to library/API func-
tion calls. Future research needs to consider vulnerabilities
that are not associated to library/API functions.
8 CONCLUSION
We have presented µVulDeePecker, which is the first deep
learning-based multiclass vulnerability detection system. Its
capability in pinning down the type of vulnerability in a
code gadget (i.e., a number of statements) helps human ana-
lysts in recognizing vulnerabilities. The multiclass detection
capability largely comes from the use of code attentions.
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Systematic experiments show that µVulDeePecker is effec-
tive, that accommodating control-dependence can lead to
higher detection capabilities, and that µVulDeePecker can be
used together with other systems (e.g., VulDeePecker+) to
capture more useful information for multiclass vulnerability
detection. The limitations discussed above are interesting
open problems for future investigations.
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